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The army of Israel publishes the primary report on October 7, 2023 bankruptcies

The army of Israel publishes the primary report on October 7, 2023 bankruptcies
Israeli soldiers Epa Candle Light on a commemorative site for the victims of the Hamas attack at the Supernova Music Festival on October 7, 2023, near Kibbutz Reim, Southern Israel (January 31, 2025)EPA

About 1,200 individuals had been killed when Hamas attacked the Israeli communities, the army bases and a music pageant on 7 October 2023

The Israel Army printed its first official report of the errors that led to its failures in the course of the assault on October 7, 2023 of Hamas, which triggered the Gaza conflict.

The report concludes that the Israeli protection forces (IDF) “failed in its mission to guard Israeli civilians”.

The 19 -page report incorporates lots that’s already recognized on what has led to a catastrophic lack of about 1,200 lives when about 5,000 males armed with Hamas and different Palestinian teams stormed in Israel, additionally taking 251 hostages within the course of.

There aren’t any dramatic revelations, however it’s nonetheless reassuring to see the army conclusions on how he judged the intentions of Hamas and underestimated his talents organized in black and white.

The report states that the army thought-about Gaza as a secondary safety menace, with precedence given to Iran and Hezbollah. His coverage in the direction of Gaza, he says, was “paradoxical: Hamas was illegitimate, but there was no effort to develop an alternate”.

The army had chosen an method to “battle administration” to face Gaza, he says. And he had hypothesized that Hamas was “neither (a) nor in preparation for a big -scale conflict” – a notion strengthened by Hamas’ deception ways.

The exams from 2018 onwards suggesting that Hamas – which is prohibited as a terrorist group from Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom and different international locations – the event of an bold plan was interpreted as “unrealistic or not possible”, reflecting “Hamas’s lengthy -term aspirations reasonably than an not possible menace”.

The report states that within the months previous the conflict, the path of army intelligence has began to develop a brand new analysis, suggesting that Hamas plan was not merely a imaginative and prescient however “a concrete framework for operational planning”.

However, this rising analysis was not dropped at the eye of the excessive officers in army intelligence.

grey placeholderThe Palestinians of Reuters climb at the top of an Israeli military charter set damaged during the attack of 7 October 2023 of Hamas in Israel, on the Israeli part of the Israeli-Gaza perimeter enclosureReuters

The report says that about 5,000 Hamas armed males and different Palestinian teams of Gaza have attacked in three waves

The report identifies a big complacency strip throughout the army on the intentions of Hamas and methods to take care of the menace it represented.

“There had been no deep discussions of the query: what if we’re flawed?” The relationship says.

Over time, “a big and steady hole had developed between the assessments of Hamas and actuality intelligence”.

The report additionally highlights what he says was “a decline of profound familiarity with the completely different imaginative and prescient of the world of the enemy, together with his tradition, faith, language and historical past”.

He asks for a profound reform of the tradition of the administration of intelligence, “to advertise mental opening, skepticism, listening, studying, debate and constructive disagreement”.

He says that the will to guard sources of intelligence of nice worth has contributed to the lack of the military to extend the alert degree instantly earlier than October seventh.

Gaza’s division, he says, “was really defeated for a number of hours” on October 7, considerably compromising his potential to know what was taking place and responding successfully.

He says that the aeronautics responded rapidly, however that “there have been vital difficulties in distinguishing between IDF troops, civilians and terrorists”.

The report additionally states that in some accidents, the injured troopers had been evacuated in entrance of civilians.

grey placeholderThe Israeli troops of Reuters guide on a jeep in the south of Israel during the attack of Hamas in Israel of 7 October 2023 Reuters

It took hours for Israeli forces to renew management of the areas alongside the perimeter fence of Gaza and the times to utterly free them of the attackers

After introducing the outcomes to the Commanders on Monday, the pinnacle of the Estroverse employees of the IDF, Lieutenant Genzi Halevi, stated he had assumed full accountability for the failures.

“I embrace my accountability. It is mine. I used to be the military commander on October 7 and I’ve my accountability and I’ve all of your accountability. I see that additionally like mine. And I see that in each command of mine that has gone flawed, there’s additionally part of me,” he stated in a video.

Last month, the General introduced his resignation on bankruptcies and requested a fee of investigation to hold out a wider investigation that might have helped forestall one other assault.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who didn’t acknowledge any accountability for what occurred on October 7, stated that this state investigation ought to wait till the top of the conflict.

His critics accuse Mr. Netanyahu to not be keen to confess any private fault.

Israel responded to the assault on October 7 by launching an air and land marketing campaign in Gaza, throughout which a minimum of 48,365 individuals had been killed, based on the Ministry of Health managed by Hamas within the space.

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